This article was first published in the electronic newsletter Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) — Belarus Info Letter The Bell, # 6 (36), 2013.

Strong weak neighbor

Improving relations with the EU’s Eastern partners is among the priorities of the Lithuanian presidency. Scheduled for November, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit in Vilnius is of particular importance in this context, with the issue of Belarus inevitably on the agenda. Though not a central issue, it will be one of the focuses. The closest Eastern neighbor of Lithuania is still a black hole on the map of states neighboring the EU. Having no normal contractual relations with the EU, Belarus takes limited part in the European Neighborhood Policy and is lagging behind all the partner states in terms of approaching the EU. Belarus’ falling out of the general trend is still a major challenge for the efficiency of the EU’s Eastern policies. Only if Belarus showed some progress out of the stalemate, one could definitely speak about the success of the EaP.

However, it is not the only problem in the field. The overall dynamics of relations with the Eastern neighbors can hardly be called fully satisfactory. Solitary breakthroughs, similar to one with Moldova or, earlier, with Ukraine, frequently lead to a period of setbacks. The situation in all the partner countries with both rather authoritarian and rather democratic regimes depends predominantly on their domestic context. The impact of EU policies on their developments is minimal and, something proved by the recent history, rarely sustainable. Achieving greater sustainability and effectiveness in its foreign policies is one of the most relevant problems of the EU. For this, a stronger focus on instrumentalization of EU’s approach towards neighboring countries is needed. The EU should, first, develop proactive instruments of impact on domestic situation of the Neighborhood countries; second, adapt country-specific packages of measures, with a view on unique features of each neighbor; third, stimulate pro-European trends by using its potential of presence in the EaP region. Along with Russia, the EU is in fact a major trade and political partner for all Eastern neighbors; one could not imagine life and politics in these countries without taking into consideration relations with the EU. Ironically, the EU stays a weak neighbor. Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson have put it as a very successful metaphor, saying that the EU needs to turn its presence into influence.

Not a main question: should a minister be invited?

The level of political representation of Belarus at the EaP Summit in Vilnius is the most discussed and probably the least politically significant question regarding Belarus. The EU has resumed its restrictive measures against Belarus after events of 2010, including prohibition of high-level contacts. However, as compared to the previous period of sanctions, the package contained an exemption: the EU left an opportunity for contacts with Belarus through the minister of foreign affairs. Siarhei Martynau, the then-minister, was never under the European sanctions. It was a right decision on the side of the EU to demonstrate its openness to constructive dialogue with Belarus by keeping a channel for contacts. When Uladzimir Makei was appointed a minister of foreign affairs of Belarus, a collision emerged. On one hand, a channel for contacts and negotiations with Belarus was necessary. On the other hand, Makei had been blacklisted by the EU as the-then Head of the Administration of the President for his involvement in the events of December 2010. The only channel left for a purpose of normal communication was automatically closed.

According to the logics that isolation of Belarus is not acceptable, the minister of foreign affairs should be excluded from the EU travel ban list. Such an exception should be done only for the minister of foreign affairs, whoever occupies this position. It enables the EU to stick to its values and avoid lowering the level of demands on Belarus and people who are personally involved in rights violations, but also to demonstrate good will and leave the doors open for Belarus. In terms of political effectiveness, inviting the minister of foreign affairs to the Summit in Vilnius and excluding him from the ban list is the most correct step. However, it will definitely cause a wave of negative reactions both in Belarus and the EU from the politicians who rhetorically adhere to the idea of ‘non-cooperation’ with Lukashenka’s regime.

The main question: how should EU build its policy vis-à-vis Belarus?

The overall approach of the EU towards Belarusis more important and politically significant.In today’s situation, the EU is using a followingpackage of foreign policy tools to impact Belarus.Tool 1 is the restrictive measures against theofficials responsible for human rights violationsas well as businessmen and enterprises presumablylinked to supporting Lukashenka’s regime.Tool 2 is a set of measures to support the civilsociety and political opposition in Belarus. Andfinally, tool 3 is the technical cooperation of theEU with the Belarusan state, including the socalled sectoral dialogues of the European Commissionwith correspondent Belarusan ministrieson energy, economy, regional developmentetc. This package of tools has obviously failed tochange situation for the better in Belarus duringthe last two and a half years since December2010.

The European Dialogue on Modernization (EDM)constitutes another attempt to grabble new toolsfor work with Belarus. However, after its launcha year and a half ago, the EDM has never turnedinto a space or a process to generate new ideas orapproaches towards Belarus. Twofold positionof the European Commission and the EuropeanExternal Action Service was one of the reasonsbehind it. On one hand, they declare commitmentto the strategy of engagement with civil andpolitical organizations of Belarus through multistakeholderexchange and the dialogue primarily“by Belarusans, for Belarus, about Belarus”. Onthe other hand, any proactive attempts by pro-European public actors and stakeholders of Belarusto influence goals, the idea and concept ofEDM were limited in any possible way. Yet, whatcomes as the weakness No. 1 of EDM is an inabilityof the Belarusan civil and political forces toexpress a consolidated position and agree on actionsin the framework of the Dialogue. EDM asit is now has never gone beyond the concept ofa study circle for a pool of experts. It has neverincluded state representatives, state experts orproperly members of civil and political forces.The Dialogue participants now sadly represent noone but themselves, so far away from the originalidealistic concept of multi-stakeholder exchange.Therefore, with no new acceptable package oftools towards Belarus by now, the Summit inVilnius becomes a hostage of developments inBelarus. Should a significant improvement of humanrights situation occur in Belarus by September,the EU will be able to return to its previouspackage of tools, which was in action during the‘thaw’ period in 2008 to 2010. If such an improvementdoes not happen, the current tools will stayin place with all the doubts considering their efficiency.

Parliamentary debates

Hypothetically, a proactive strategy of relationswith Belarus can be formulated at the stage ofdrafting a report by the European Parliament.The process was initiated in the EP Committee onForeign Affairs in the autumn of 2012 by JustasPaleckis, a Lithuanian MEP from the group ofsocialists. The provisionary version of the reporthas since then gone through the first round of discussionsin the Committee, facing the traditionalproblem of polarity of European politicians’views on Belarus. In fact, there are three groupsof opinions in the EP. First: the Belarusan regimecontrols the situation in Belarus and enjoys silentsupport from the majority. The EU should take itas it is and try to build cooperation with the regimeor to identify pro-European regime officialsand engage with them. The second group of opinionsfocuses on a need to stimulate multilateralpublic dialogue of civil society and Belarusanauthorities in the country. With the civil societyobviously incapable of such a dialogue, the effortsshould be made to support the civil society players.The third group of opinions sees the currentregime in Belarus as an absolute evil, so the EUmust take all measures possible to cast it down.This group adheres to the harshest rhetoric of rejectingany contacts with the Belarusan establishmentand acts as a supporter of tough measures,including the economic blockade.

These divisions perfectly fit the divisions insideBelarus where civil and political actors share verysimilar views on possible ways forward for thecountry. This situation is a major obstacle for developinga new package of tools vis-à-vis Belarus.The European Parliament can hardly be expectedto come up with a well-articulated concept of theEU policy towards Belarus by September. A newattempt to integrate the contradictory beliefs islikeliest to result in some solution which stronglyresembles the current policy.

The regional aspect

If the European Parliament fails to contributesignificantly to the content of proposals, the Belarusanissue is going to be discussed in a traditionalrhetorical way. The EU will have to publiclyevaluate the situation in Belarus, with a note onthe situation of democracy and human rights inthe country. The Declaration on Belarus fulfilledthis role at the previous Summit in Warsaw. Thedocument was met negatively by the Belarusanauthorities and not backed by other EaP countries,as the EU proved unable to engage with EaPcountries against the Belarusan regime. The interestsof regional cooperation prevailed over theinterests of political association with the EU evenfor the countries where the EaP is a success story.Given the negative experience, the EU is unlikelyto repeat an attempt to win support of EaP countriesfor a joint position vis-à-vis Belarus. The twoyears since the previous Summit saw no indicationson the side of EaP countries to follow theEU on Belarus rather than their own interests ofbilateral cooperation.

The emerging Eurasian Union is another partof the context for the Vilnius Summit. Russia isconstructing a geopolitical alternative to the EaP,seeking to regain the geopolitical leadership in theEaP region. Belarus can only be interested in thisinitiative provided Russia continues the policy ofsubsidies to the Belarusan economic model. It isalready clear today that Belarus will make everyeffort to postpone signing political agreementsand their practical implementation if they do notmeet the country’s pragmatic interests. Just likethe EU, Russia apparently has no sufficient leverageof impact on Belarus’ domestic situation. So,the factor of the Eurasian Union will not be determinativefor EU-Belarus relations during theupcoming Summit.

The minimum program

To summarize all the aspects, we can argue thatthe upcoming Vilnius Summit is highly unlikelyto bring some comprehensive decisions on Belarus.The maximum program of reframing theoverall set of tools vis-à-vis Belarus is unrealistic.So, the minimum result achievable in today’s circumstancesis to ensure a symbolic participationof Belarus in the EaP context, to demonstrate thatit has a place in the orbit of the European policies,and to reopen the channel of diplomatic communicationon the level of a minister of foreignaffairs.

About author:

Andrei Yahorau is Director of the Centre for European transformation (CET), Master of Political Science. He graduated from Belarusan State University, department of political science, and holds a master’s degree in political science. He has been working in the political research area since 2001. The focus of research interests: transformation of the former Soviet Union space, civil society, political transformations in Belarus and the Eastern Partnership region, European studies.

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