If we take a look from our post-Soviet region, the purposes of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine seem obvious, terrible in their essence, but clear enough. As a matter of fact, Russia has never abandoned its revanchist ambitions, its dream of restoring the Empire, and its nostalgia for the USSR. These moods have always been present in the foreign policy and official discourse of Russian power.

During Yeltsin's epoch, they were expressed less vividly, but during Putin's rule they have been articulated distinctly and openly. Putin's speech in Munich, his words concerning the disintegration of the USSR as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20^th century and the new greatness of Russia — they were intentionally pronounced defiantly and flashily. It was possible not to notice and to ignore this rhetoric only intentionally, and the European Union had been doing so for a long time, continuing to consider Russia its strategic partner and ally. The illusion was to think that weak Russia only compensated its weakness by the aggressive rhetoric, but it would never be able to turn it into actions.

Today's Russia is a vast, but politically weak, economically rather poor, and technologically backward country with unreasonably huge geopolitical ambitions.

It is quite simple to prove it. For this purpose, it is enough to analyze Russia’s positions in the leading world ratings where it often loses not only to the developed countries, but to many developing ones as well. Russia’s GDP is twice less than that in the EU countries and if we consider the inequality of the national wealth distribution this backwardness will be even more obvious. As for sciences and technologies ratings, Russia occupies one of the last places and Russia’s share in the global market of hi-tech production is less than one percent (0,25% in 2011).

This tragic disbalance leads to two effects. First, it is necessary to constantly demonstrate symbolical successes in the business of returning Russia the status of world power — to expand its influence space (the “Eurasian Union”), to show its military power and sport victories. Second, Russia’s behavior is becoming aggressive and unpredictable.

The actual force of Russia is in the comparative weakness of its geopolitical environment and maintenance. The post-Soviet region, except for the Baltic States, is a set of unstable regimes and examples of failed transformations. It provides Russia with a wide field of game at the expense of using energetic levers of pressure, direct and indirect subsidizing the neighboring countries, and supporting smoldering interethnic and interstate conflicts.

Other geopolitical centers, first of all — the EU, which have their influence in the region, are not able to convert their presence into a dominating force either. The European Union is weakened by its internal economic contradictions and has a difficult system of coordination and decision-making between its 28 members, which makes its foreign policy rather remote from consistency and efficiency. Besides, the EU depends on the stability of deliveries of the Russian power resources, while some of its members have rather beneficial relations with the Russian Federation. All these make them passive and loyal to the doubtful Russian policy and force them to turn a blind eye to its aggressive rhetoric and actions and even to block more resolute actions of the other EU countries concerning Moscow.

For another global player — the USA — our region is not of any considerable interest; here, the USA concedes leadership to the European Union, preferring to avoid serious interventions.

This amorphism and shiftlessness of the West have allowed Russia to believe in the revival of its force and world power status, and this belief has been followed by actions.

First, Russia began to increase its presence and influence in the so-called “near abroad” countries (i.e. former Soviet republics) by creating and financing pro-Russian forces, as well as simply by buying a part of political elites. Second, it intervened in Georgia and actually occupied a part of the territory of the independent state, having established in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the regimes it controls. These actions of Putin’s Russia were never punished and after a short crisis its relations with the leading world powers were restored. Putin became completely convinced that nobody could threaten Russia’s expansion and that it was possible to start more resolute actions.

In a sense, the Eastern Partnership was the European Union’s response to Russia’s expansionary actions. However, this initiative is based on the principles of using the “soft force” and gradually involving the neighboring countries in the process of rapprochement with the EU. Thus, the European Union tried to level the geopolitical and political meaning of the Eastern Partnership, placing emphasis on the formal (negotiable) side of cooperation with the countries-neighbors and the formal adaptation of the EU norms and standards in their legislations. Here, the questions of Russia’s external influence and the inner political situations in the countries of the Eastern Partnership remained without attention.

For a certain period of time, such a strategy bore fruit, but only because Russia did not consider the Eastern Partnership to be a serious proposal of the European Union — this partnership did not offer either big money, or prospects of the EU membership. Russia underestimated the appeal of the EU model and the power of the “soft force” for the countries that neighbor upon the EU and missed the moment when the majority of these countries symbolically left Russia’s influence.

After the EU association agreements were initiated by three countries (Armenia, Moldova, Georgia) and the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement had to be signed, the Summit of the Eastern Partnership in November 2013 in Vilnius should have marked the triumph of the EU new integration strategy. Only the comprehension of the fact that the countries of the region are slowly, but inevitably turning towards the West and that the Eurasian Union cannot compete with the appeal of the EU association has pushed Russia to resort to strenuous actions aimed at blocking this process. The countries that depend on Russia economically and politically to the greatest degree have been pressurized — Armenia and Ukraine. The EU “soft force” has appeared unable to resist Russia’s total political and economic pressure upon the countries of the region. After Armenia’s and Ukraine’s refusal of association, there should be other countries, too, but still — Ukraine is the key element here.

It was easy for Russia to stop the process in Armenia where its military presence and political control over elites is especially strong. Ukraine is much more uncompliant. The ruling corrupted pro-Russian “Party of Regions”, the government, and President Yanukovych made concessions easily, while the population of Ukraine treated extremely negatively the geopolitical turn of their country towards the eastern neighbor. For the people of Ukraine, the refusal of the European way was equivalent to the refusal of their dream, ideal, hope for the best — everything that had been approved for a long time, including by Yanukovych.

The sharp demarche of the Ukrainian president and government and the wrecking of arrangements with the EU resulted in the mass protests all across Ukraine, but the Euromaidan passed very quickly from the requirements to return to the way of integration with the EU to the direct political demands to change the political regime in Ukraine; the revolt against corruption and authoritarian ways of management. The Ukrainian authorities appeared unable to cope with the revolutionary protest and a change of elites took place in this country — the pro-Russian “Party of Regions” conceded its power to pro-West oppositional politicians. For Putin and Russian leadership, it means a loss of their political control over Ukraine and, hence, a failure of their own neo-imperial ambitions. In this situation, Putin has begun implementing his backup plan aimed at destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, which was already tested in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The point is to destabilize the south-east areas of Ukraine, which do not support the new revolutionary leadership of the country. According to Putin’s plan, the chaos and instability are to force Ukrainians to address to Russia for help in putting all in order, which will allow Russia to establish external control over Eastern Ukraine. Still, here the situation is not so unequivocal and Ukrainians themselves happen to be more consolidated, being afraid of the new authorities much less than of Russia’s guardianship.

Only in Crimea does it become possible to play to the full the scenario of destabilization, power change in the region, and appeals for “external assistance”. Russia de facto begins a military intervention in Crimea, using its special troops and forces of its Black Sea fleet based in Crimea, concealing their belonging to the Russian army. While threatening the integrity and stability of Ukraine, Putin is simultaneously trying to pressurize the new Kyiv authorities in order to either return in power his protégé Yanukovych, or to force the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine to appoint a pro-Russian structure of the government.

This scenario can become successful only if the West remains passive and allows Putin to implement it. But, unlike the situation with Georgia, the international community’s reaction is sharper. The threat of excluding Russia from G8, the rigorous diplomatic pressure of the leaders of the EU member states and the USA, the recall of ambassadors, the demonstrational “flogging” of Russia in the UN Security Council, the transparent hint on possible sanctions, and even a military intervention at this stage — all these have forced Putin to refuse bringing Russian troops into Crimea. Still, by and large, it is only a symbolical retreat and refusal of the most rigid scenario. The Russian army is de facto in Crimea under the guise of national self-defense forces; they keep controlling the situation, threatening the Ukrainian local administration and Ukrainian military men billeted in Crimea. Russia’s attempts to shake the situation in the eastern part of Ukraine have not been stopped either.

Putin will not confine himself to Ukraine only. His plans are much wider.

The absorption of Armenia is coming with a wet sail; pro-Russian officials are being included in the country’s leadership and there is a large-scale program of integrating Armenia in the “Eurasian Union”. Steps have been taken to block the process of Moldova’s rapprochement with the EU — Russia’s control over Transnistria and its strong influence in Gagauzia are being used. If Russia brings Ukraine under its control, Russia’s hands will become free for new attempts to pressurize Georgia and Belarus.

Belarus is perceived by many as an already played card, as a country that has been controlled by Russia strongly and for a long time. Still, in many respects, it is an illusion. Of course, Belarus is in the field of Russia’s strong influence, but it preserves its independence. This independence is based on the ironclad control of Lukashenko's administration over the machinery of state (the “power vertical”), as well as on the control of the state over the basic industrial assets that, in its turn, gives a chance to control the labor employment of the population. The peripheral activity of society that is free from the dictatorship of the state is weak and disjointed and cannot be considered a political force.

Unlike Ukraine, in Belarus there are no independent elites, oligarchical clans, wide public activity. The scenario of subduing Belarus will be different.

First, Russia will try to make certain spheres of economy uncontrolled by the Belarusan authorities by transferring the regulation functions to the supranational bodies of the Eurasian Union.

Second, Russia will try to destroy the unity and integrity of the state administration system by using various lines of activity — from the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusan control over the army (common troops, etc.) to the infiltration of power services with the Russian secret agents, the creation of joint customs regulatory bodies, direct bribery of elites, etc.

Third, Russia will try to achieve the privatization of significant Belarusan enterprises in favor of the Russian capital and to deepen Belarus’ credit and energy dependence on Russia.

The Belarusan authorities see and, we hope, understand these threats. At the same time, the limits of Belarus’ resistance to Russia’s expansion are in the possibility of maneuvering between the EU and Russia and in the meanwhile successful strategy of exchanging its symbolical loyalty to Putin’s initiatives for economic preferences. However, if Russia brings Ukraine under its control, Belarus will lose its status of the only western geopolitical ally of Russia. The space for maneuvers will be reduced critically and the potential threats of a complete loss of sovereignty will become more than real.

About author:

Andrei Yahorau is the Director of the Centre for European transformation (CET), Master of Political Science. He graduated from Belarusan State University, department of political science, and holds a master’s degree in political science. He has been working in the political research area since 2001. The focus of research interests: transformation of the former Soviet Union space, civil society, political transformations in Belarus and the Eastern Partnership region, European studies.

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