It is perfectly obvious today. Russia has lost all the wars it has waged this year; there are several of them — in different areas and at different levels.

Here are just some of them:

1. The most noticeable, visible is a hot war with Ukraine, intervention in Ukraine, occupation of the Crimea, diversionary war in Donbas.
2. Geopolitical war with “the West” and NATO for the restoration of the Empire and the establishment of bipolarity in the world.
3. Internal war in the post-Soviet region for keeping control over the diverging states, partly affecting Central Europe and the Balkans.
4. Information war.
5. War for consciousness.

These are very different wars. If it was permissible, with regard to a war, using the concept of “theater of war”, then theaters of these wars would lie in different worlds; and the same categories and concepts in describing the wars are absolutely inapplicable.

In the first two wars that, albeit with reservations and in very general form, can be attributed to the same type, the war is being unfolded on the territories; these wars are being waged for the territories. Territory is the lowest layer, or the stage of the theater of war. All the other components of the war are just the scenery on the stage, infrastructure. This type of warfare is as old as civilization itself. Wars of the Stone Age were waged (they say, in New Guinea, such kind of wars was waged until very recently, even after World War II) for scalps and production that can be attributed to movable property: things, treasures, slaves and women. But the first civilizations and archaic states fought for the property — for territories and for everything being attached to the territories: fertile land, water sources, bridges and ferries, minerals, etc. These types of ancient wars were still waged in the twentieth century, they are still underway in the XXI century, but it has become archaic in the modern world, these wars have become outdated with the fall of the colonial system.

The war in the post-Soviet space is a new type of war: a war of postcolonial era. In such wars not a territory itself is important, but the symbolic control over it. Not a territory as land or underground resources, but human activities being unfolded on the territory, market activity, in the first place. The winner doesn’t claim to political power in the conquered territory; it is sufficient that markets and resources remain under his control. Such war is the extension of the economy, just by other means. If it was possible to manage with purely symbolic means, they would tend not to resort to armed actions and murders in such wars. A typical example of such war is the declaration of Belarus a “canonical territory of Orthodoxy”, where “Orthodoxy” means the Moscow Patriarchate, and “canonicity” implies eternal and undoubted Belarus' dependence on Moscow. “Theater of war” in post-colonial wars is the economy, and “troops” are made up of diplomats, investors, salesmen, bankers. The army or intelligence services are used only occasionally, and yet, not to deploy the troops, but for raider and police operations.

Information warfare is also as old as peace on our planet. However, in previous periods of history information wars have always been accompanying hot wars. States in the course of wars are always seeking to maximize production and minimize losses and costs. They have sought to undermine the morale of an adversary by means of information warfare, reducing thereby adversary’s power of resistance, and raising thus the fighting spirits of troops and allies. Sometimes, an information war accompanied cultural expansion, or a war of cultures. Nowadays, everybody has been stricken by such features of the information war launched by the Kremlin, that fit neither into a version of an accompaniment of a hot war, nor in a version of a war of cultures. These eye-catching features of the information war of 2013-2014 remain obscure, unless we consider the entirely new type of wars that has arisen only in the most recent history, in the postmodern era, part of which is the given information war.

It is a war for consciousness in which the “theater of war” is consciousness in its ontological status. Here, as Yuriy Gromyko, one of the main troubadours of the war for consciousness in Russia, writes about it:

“War for consciousness suggests that the world has entered a new stage of a fight, namely competition of consciousness’ organization forms where the subject of defeat and destruction are certain types of consciousness. I.e., the task is no more and no less than as follows: as a result of the war for consciousness, certain types of consciousness must simply be destroyed, cease to exist. At the same time bearers of these forms of consciousness, on the contrary, may be saved if they abandon their forms of consciousness, the object of destruction and defeat. The types of consciousness — objects of defeat in the war for consciousness — must be pushed beyond the forms, permissible and acceptable by the civilization.”

The awareness of the emergence of this new, the most up-to-date type of war has begun in the years of the Cold War between the two world systems, but it is completely taking shape in our eyes. Yet, October 1917 could be marked as the beginning of the war for consciousness. Then, the Bolsheviks set out the task, “We will build our new world”, and for the construction of this world and for living in it, a “new man” was needed, as the “old people” with the old type of consciousness did not fit into “this new world”. At that time, the Bolsheviks called it “Cultural Revolution” which was put forward as part of a triune task in the program of the All-Union Communist Party Bolsheviks (VKPb) along with the Industrialization and Collectivization. “Cultural Revolution” in the Soviet Union put the task of raising a new man. Back then, the task was understood in a very primitive way, the tools were the most simple: forced labor camps (of the Gulag system) and education based on the pedagogy by Makarenko, which arose from a labor camp for homeless children and juvenile offenders. Further, there was the “Cultural Revolution” in China, and the apotheosis became the Kampuchea of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. These are dirty manifestations of war for consciousness, which victims, although these wars were waged for control over the consciousness and for a “new man”, were “bearers of consciousness”.

Realizing the defeat in the Cold War which was waged without a single shot, theorists of the war for consciousness came to realize exactly this formula, “Certain types of consciousness must simply be destroyed, cease to exist, while the bearers of these forms of consciousness, on the contrary, may be saved.” This is the best formulation of the meaning and purposes of the war for consciousness. Not people, but the mental structures are being destroyed (the system of values, personal identity), moral values are destroyed, the conscience is profaned, etc. Therefore, “warriors” and “generals” of war for consciousness operate with moral categories, appeal to the deep structures of consciousness, and fasten destroyed parts of structures by “spiritual connection”.

Thus, Russia has lost all these wars. Let’s consider in order what is the victory and what is the loss in each of these types of wars; and also, what Russia has gained or lost during these wars.

1. The war with Ukraine

Intervention and occupation of Ukrainian territories was planned by the Russian General Staff as an auxiliary operation in the framework of economic expansion in Ukraine and as an argument for political pressure. Despite the long-standing work over this task, nobody in the Staff developed a detailed plan of this war, and the war started earlier than it had been planned. By the beginning of 2014, only the plan of the Crimea annexation was worked up, and it was carried out with minimal losses and destructions. They had to start the expansion of the war in the “New Russia” without a plan and with minimal forces. Unreadiness of the Ukrainian army and chaos in the government contributed to the success of this poorly planned operation, and Russian sabotage groups managed to gain a foothold in several districts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. The reckoning to the broad support of Russia's actions on the part of the Ukraine population did not come true.

What was Russia hoping to achieve while unleashing the war with Ukraine?

1. To prevent the entry of Ukraine into the EU and NATO.
2. To weaken the Ukrainian state.
3. To strengthen the pro-Russian sentiment in South-Eastern Ukraine to keep the constant pressure on the Kyiv authorities with the aim of maintaining political and economic control there.
4. To strengthen the defense lines on territories under Russia’s control to counter NATO and the EU.
5. To turn Ukraine into a loyal satellite of Russia, like Belarus.
6. Free presence of Russian business in the Ukrainian market.

What has Russia gained in the war with Ukraine?

1. The occupied Crimea.
2. Territories of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, being held by force.
3. Full control over the largest naval base in the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

What else? We can not consider acquisition the equipment, dismantled at several factories in Luhansk and Donetsk, exported to Russia by the so-called “humanitarian convoy” on the way back. Although, at a certain state of consciousness, in some antiquated logic, such “spoils of war” can be regarded as a success. Still, it is a subject of psychiatry and should be considered in the context of war for consciousness.

The objectives which the war was unleashed to gain, remained unachieved. On the contrary, the situation has worsened regarding each of these objectives.

What has Russia lost during this war?

1. Russia's international position has sharply deteriorated, and the influence on international processes has weakened.
2. The sanctions have been imposed against Russia; this has led to falling prices for Russia's main exports, fall of the ruble, threat of economic crisis.
3. For Ukraine which is still far from the standards that allow it to become member of the EU, the simplified procedures and standards have been proposed, and Ukraine's integration with Europe has accelerated.
4. NATO membership for Ukraine became impossible, but its cooperation with NATO has deepened, and the NATO military facilities became much closer to Russian borders than before.
5. The consolidation of Ukrainian nation and strengthening of its state agencies has arisen, including the army, as a reaction to the Russia’ aggression.
6. Growth of anti-Russian sentiment in all of Ukraine has strengthened, including the occupied Crimea and held by power Donbas districts.
7. The economic collapse has gripped the occupied Ukrainian territories, and it will never be possible to use them as a pro-Russian lobby in Ukraine.
8. Russian business has suffered significant losses not only in the markets of Ukraine, but also in the European markets.

And that's not all. So far, we may not consider the losses incurred by Russia on the ground: it is not only economic difficulties, it is also undermined credibility of the Russian population on the state, destruction of civil society, etc. — all the effects that will have their impact later.

2. The war with “the West” and NATO

This is a strange unilateral war. Russia is at war with those who are not fighting against it and are not going to fight. It's not even a war, but an echo of the Cold War, which ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. In today's world, the balance of forces is that Russia's war against the Western World is, in fact, the war against the First World, using the terminology of the Cold War times. For its economic potential and political influence Russia is among the top twenty developed countries. Though, if its political influence allows Russia being one of the top spots in the G-20, its economic potential gives it one of the last spots in it. Actually, these 20 countries make up what is metaphorically called in Russia “the West”. By declaring a global war to the West, Russia is entering into a confrontation with the other 19 countries of the G-20. Forces are knowingly unequal.

However, in order to make this global war completely meaningless, it would be enough just the seven countries of the G-8, a sort of club of favourites, or the most powerful countries in the world, where Russia has been invited to the memory of its former greatness, and because of its prestige and influence in the Third World (ie, among the countries that are not considered the most developed (the First World) and have not become part of the socialist camp (the Second World) during the Cold War).

And, nevertheless, Russia declares that it is fighting on the territory of Ukraine with the West and NATO, military organization of the First World. What for? The main motive of this declarative unilateral war is masking. The fact is that a war with Ukraine until recently seemed unthinkable thing to the present generations; no one but science fiction writers and modelers of insane models of the future could imagine such a war. However, intensive propaganda of anti-Ukrainian sentiments over the years has done its part, and the Russian public opinion was rather negative towards Ukraine by 2013, but it wasn’t hostile enough to greet war and occupation of a neighbour country. Quite another thing is the war with the United States, NATO and “hostile” West. Such a war was easy to be accepted by the Russian public opinion. Well, if Ukraine and “brotherly people” could be a little hurt at the same time, alas! It is all expenses as Ukraine, in this case, appears as a traitor.

So, what is Russia hoping to gain in this war?

1. First of all, revenge for the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.
2. Weakening of NATO (in simplified form, withdrawal of troops and NATO bases away from Russian borders and creation of a buffer zone between Russia and NATO).
3. Consolidation of countries with strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiments around Russia (such as the BRICS countries).
4. Return of Russian dominant role in the Third world.
5. Return of Russian status of a second center of power in the world (after the United States).

What has Russia acquired in the course of this war?

Nothing. And there’s no need of any clarifications.

What has Russia lost in the course of this war?

1. NATO came closer to Russian borders; additional NATO military bases have been deployed, the existing bases in Poland and the Baltics have been expanded. Linkages between Ukraine and NATO have been strengthened. Finland is reviewing its politics of neutrality.
2. Russia's authority has significantly eroded among the G8 and the G20 countries. Germany ceased to be the most ardent supporter of Russia in Europe and has taken the lead in imposing the sanctions and pressing Russia.
3. Countries of the “buffer zone” (the Eastern Partnership), including Belarus, have received evidence of the aggressive intentions of Russia and have inclined towards a pro-Western orientation.
4. The BRICS partner countries haven’t taken the Russia’s part.
5. The Third world countries have remained indifferent to Russia's attempts to regain their confidence.
6. Russia's economic growth stopped. The main sources of its economic growth — the oil price and the monopoly on the supply of gas — proved manageable by consolidated actions of the G-8 and the G-20 countries. Russian economy faces a protracted crisis.

3. The internal war in the post-Soviet region

Russian dominance in the post-Soviet region hasn’t been questioned throughout all the period after the collapse of the USSR. Only the three former Soviet republics initially had unshakable desire to escape from the zone of Russian influence and in 2004 became part of the European Union. The remaining eleven countries signed an agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), effectively recognizing their dependence on Russia. Gradually, those of the post-Soviet countries that could benefit from their independence began to reconsider their place in the CIS and to distance themselves from Russia. Russia, for its part, also could not afford to be closely involved in the issues with this vast region. As for the post-Soviet states of Central Asia, Russia simply forgot about them for a long time. Receiving no Russian support, these countries drifted — each along its trajectory. Being unable to control the post-Soviet region by economic means, Russia used territorial disputes, military conflicts and energy dependence of the small countries to interfere in their internal affairs. Timid attempts to escape from the Russian influence (the GUAM, orientation of some countries towards Turkey or Romania) were not very successful and effective for a long time.

As a result of the CIS centrifugal tendencies, the project failed.

In contrast to these tendencies, attempts to run the centripetal processes were made. These are numerous initiatives of Kazakhstan on the creation of any kind of a Eurasian union, and the overly spun and inconceivable “Union State of Russia and Belarus”, and short-lived customs unions. Neither of these initiatives worked. The Union State was shaken by annual oil, gas, milk and other trade and customs wars. Customs departments in cooperation with health services of the Russian Federation have become the main instrument of pressure on the CIS countries. From time to time the departments introduce a ban on trade on some or other goods (Georgian and Moldovan wine, meat and even mineral water).

Then Russia made the first attempt to regulate relations with the CIS countries through military actions — the attack on Georgia in 2008 and the establishment of the puppet states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Before the war in Georgia, Russia had the experience of participation in armed conflicts by limited contingent in Transnistria and Tajikistan, as well as by military assistance to the parties of the Karabakh conflict. Russia did not wage war in these regions; rather, it ensured protection of its interests in the hot spots. Well, it did so not only in the hot spots, but in the other, as well, which were considered to be of strategic importance for Russia. For example, by the presence of Russian troops on the territory of Belarus and in the Crimea.

The war with Georgia opened a new chapter in Russia's relations with the CIS countries, and not only. A Polish-Swedish initiative for the six CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) became known after the war. The initiative legalized its status in 2009 as an EU initiative Eastern Partnership.

The sense of the partnership of the six post-Soviet countries with the EU was to slow down their drift in the direction of the United Europe, to provide them with a free choice of ways of further development — the choice between European integration and integration with Russia. Initiators of the Eastern Partnership strongly emphasized that this initiative has no way been directed against Russia. Non-inclusion of Russia in this initiative meant recognition of it being a second center of power in the region. Though, Russia was not happy with such course, it could not let having an alternative for these six countries and saw their fate without alternatives, only as the increasing dependence on Russia.

Participation in the Eastern Partnership definitely put all the six countries to the choice that did not unite them but, rather, contributed to their self-determination. Belarus explicitly chose Russia of two alternatives. Azerbaijan remained indifferent to the choice and, being energy independent, needed only Russian support in the Karabakh conflict. Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova were inclined towards the European Union. The most difficult choice was faced by Armenia, but even this country was on the way of signing an Association Agreement with the EU.

Russia interfered in the internal affairs of these six countries in a varying degree. The strongest intervention was observed exactly in Ukraine. Interweaving interests of the oligarchic groups in Russia and Ukraine were so great that many sectors of the countries’ economies were virtually common, if it did not have to do with state monopolies. Presence of the Russian media, pop culture, show businesses in the Ukraine information field was the highest when compared with the other countries. Campaign managers from Russia at the elections in Ukraine felt as though the place belonged to them.

But, at the same time, Ukraine remained the freest and the most democratic country in the CIS and in the Eastern Partnership, although the most problematic one. Presence of thorny issues in Ukraine excited and consolidated Ukrainian society while democratic freedoms enhanced its maturity; this finally led to the Maidan and the Ukrainian revolution.

The Ukrainian revolution was in no way directed against Russia. But Ukrainians chose Europe, not Russia of the two alternatives, as the Russian dominance over two decades brought no good to the country.

Russia, with its non-alternative doctrine for the Eastern Partnership countries and, in particular, for Ukraine, could not accept such a scenario.

Although since Putin's return to the Kremlin Russia has been preparing to a possible war with Ukraine, it was not ready to this war by 2013. Though, as the situation got out of control, they had to begin the war without proper preparation. Operations in the Crimea and in Donbas were developed in a sketch layout: in the Crimea — to a greater extent, in Donbas — to a less one. But the most important thing was that Russia had managed to prepare collaborators and to brainwash the population in the Crimea, while it hadn’t — in Donbas. Though, there was reckoning on the support of the population not only in these regions, but also in the whole so called “New Russia”. It was exactly that the support of the local population had to ensure the success of the whole operation. Anyway, by arousing anti-Georgian sentiment among Abkhaz and Ossetians, Russia carried out occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Crimea, the move was repeated, but in other regions of Ukraine it did not work.

The content of the proposal, which Russia applied with to Ukrainian people in the war, and to other people of the Eastern Partnership (and the Baltic states, at the same time), was a proposal of the “Russian World”.

As it turned out, this “World” hasn’t been attractive at all either to Ukrainians or to citizens of other post-Soviet countries. Russia has lost this war, as well.

What is Russia hoping to gain in the war with the CIS countries?

1. To solve by military means the problems caused by Russia’s incompetent and unsuccessful political interference in the affairs of independent states — former Soviet republics; to keep them under economic and political control. To divide and rule.
2. To weaken Ukraine as a major rival in the post-Soviet space.
3. To ensure there is no alternative political and economic development for the CIS countries, to intimidate political elites of these countries, to demonstrate to Europe that it has nothing to do with this region.

That has Russia acquired in this war?

1. Crimea, and not forever. Maybe it will not return into the Crimea within Ukraine, but in Russia it won’t remain either. Maybe, a fantasy of Vasily Aksyonov about “the Island of Crimea” will come true.
2. The Eastern Partnership in its original form has lost its essence.

What has Russia lost in this war?

1. Despite Russia’s wishes, Ukraine has become stronger in all respects through the consolidation of society, reformed public administration, prospects for rapid economic growth. Ukraine is turning into a real leader instead of being a rival for leadership in the CIS.
2. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU.
3. Pro-Russian parties were defeated in the parliamentary elections in Moldova, Russia lost its allies as represented by Moldovan communists.
4. The EAEC has not taken place, despite Armenia’s forced Declaration of accession. Kazakhstan and Belarus expressed in various forms distrust of this another phantom initiative.
5. Belarus, being the most loyal satellite of Russia in the CIS, has not recognized either annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or the annexation of the Crimea, taking a-wait-and-see policy; in fact, it has kept a neutral position.
6. Alternative channels of energy supplies to the CIS countries have appeared; projects of gas and oil supplies to Europe have been curtailed, bypassing Ukraine and Belarus.
7. The disintegration of the CIS has become irreversible.

4. The information war

Information warfare is not something new in history; it is as old as a war with weapons. As the weapons have changed from stone axes to combat robots, so the means of information influence have evolved from a martial songs to the Internet. The current information war, unleashed by Russia, is characterized by a number of features that give it a separate place in history.

Throughout military history of the twentieth century, information warfare was becoming increasingly important and meaningful policy tool. Information war wasn’t not just accompanying hot wars, it was rather in significance in own right. In the long term, information warfare could manage without using weapons at all. Globally, the information war was unfolded by the First International, and continued by the Soviet Union with the help of the Third International. Since then, this information war did not stop until the collapse of the USSR, with the exception of a kind of break from 1933 to 1945, when the Nazi Third Reich, being the common enemy of the West and the East tried to expand to the whole world its information war. A special place in this global war is given to a stage of the Cold War, which consisted of three main components:

1. Economic competition between the two socio-economic systems.
2. Arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
3. Ideological competition, or “psychological warfare”.

After 1989, it seemed that as the Cold War came to an end, so happened with the arms race and the information war also (or, as it was called, “Psychological War”), since the bipolar world has become pluralistic. Partly, this was the reason why the scale and intensity of the information war, deployed by Russia was a big surprise to the whole world.

Information support of hot wars solved the two main tasks at all times:

1. Mobilization of “friends”, excitation of the fighting spirit and creating an image of the foe.
2. Demoralization and misinformation of the enemy.

These were the tasks that information wars were reduced to; in these wars population, army and state of each of the belligerents were incorporated. The last war with such information support was the World War I, in which there were modern civil nations. Agitation, propaganda and all means of information influence in 1914-1918 were aimed at ensuring the national unity of the army, society and the state. Quite different aims were pursued by the First and the Third Internationals, as well as by the USSR afterwards: they destroyed this unity, opposing the mass proletarizing society to states of the ruling classes, turning the armies into instruments of the class war. That is why the Social-Democrats of the early twentieth century refused to the First International and created the Second International that was more of a prototype of future supranational world-wide organizations than an instrument of the class struggle.

The idea of dividing a nation and opposing a society and a state has been then used in the Cold War against the USSR and its allies. And since the United States and the West could not rely on the class paradigm in this war, so the information war took on the character of psychological war, ie not a war of classes and social groups, but of an individual and a citizen against the diktat of the state. An ideologem of “Human Rights” was put up against an ideologem of “Class Justice”. In the period from 1917 to 1945, the Marxist ideology won and attracted more and more supporters. During this period, the ideologem of “Class Justice” was worked out professionally, in detail, and it had no alternative. The Nazis offered racial justice instead of a class one, but they were also forced to give it a social form. They chose not to oppose the idea of unity of a nation and the idea of social and class struggle, but to combine them instead into a syncretic complex of National Socialism. Subsequently, the same path will be followed by the Soviet Union, as well, although forcedly. But even in this form the class paradigm could not compete with the idea of human rights, which definitely took shape only in the late 1940s — early 1950s in the West. And from that time on the Soviet Union has been losing the information war. The crucial event in the early 1950s was not obvious, so the two sides in the Cold War were interested in the construction of the Iron Curtain, separating the information space of the opponents.

The Iron Curtain turned out to be a semipermeable membrane: it prevented the spread of socio-political information, but proved to be permeable to music, visual arts, fashion and content of youth subcultures. Apparently, music and fashion could not undermine the social order, so their penetration was treated not as ideological struggle, but as psychological one. In accordance with such interpretation, the means and methods of information war were devised and developed in those years.

What we can observe in the current information war, only partially resembles information wars of the XX^th century.

Firstly, there is no clear ideological foundation in this war as a class or racial paradigm. Russia is forced to operate with amorphous ideologems, often borrowed from those whom it considers the opponents in this war. These are human rights, and free market, and the right of nations to self-determination, merged though with Russian nationalism and chauvinism. Instead of modern ideologies, syncretic postmodern memes and slogans are forcedly used in this war.

Secondly, this information war is waged without a monopoly on the media and the Iron Curtain, ie the “theater of war” is the open globalized information space. It is, indeed, the “World Information War I”.

Thirdly, this war uses the whole repertoire gained through information, ideological, psychological wars of the XXth century. It makes very difficult to analyze and understand this information war.

In this war, Russia uses not only the channels of information dissemination, but also the methods of psychological influence, artistic techniques of cinema, television as a special visual art affecting the psycho-emotional part of consciousness.

This is the most expensive information war in history. It involves not only the Russian media, but this of the other countries; not only state propagandists and agitators, but also journalists; not only journalists, but also bloggers, users of social networks on the Internet.

What is Russia hoping to gain in the information war?

1. The main purpose of this information war is to prove that Russia does not wage any war. A war is so unpopular in the modern world that the recognition of Russia's participation in a war would automatically lead to large reputational losses and a rapid defeat. The war is not wished not only by Ukraine’s population, but by Russia’s population, as well.
2. Achieving ordinary purposes of an information war: demoralization of the Ukrainian society and disintegration of Ukraine under the pretext of federalization, on the one hand, and mobilization of Russian society, on the other hand.
3. Distracting Russian public opinion from the actual Russian problems and difficulties that the Putin regime is unable to cope with, and shifting attention to the “small victorious war”.
4. After the outbreak of war (the occupation of the Crimea), new objectives were added to the old ones:

• representing the war between Russia and Ukraine as a civil war in Ukraine, or separatist rebellion in some regions in the eyes of the Russian and international community;
• portraying the war with Ukraine as a war with the West, USA in the first place, for the Russian and Ukrainian public opinion.

5. Mobilizing Russia’s support by Russian-speaking diaspora in other countries, as in those that may be the next victims of aggression, so in those that may undertake economic or other sanctions against Russia.

What has Russia acquired in this information war?

1. Very high support for the political regime, which reaches 85% in the Russian society.
2. Enthusiasm and excitement in the Russian-speaking diaspora around the world.
3. Support by the right-wing parties and movements in different countries.
4. For several months, Russia managed to create an information cover of its military aggression in Ukraine, to delay the recognition of it as a party in an armed conflict. And until now, Russia has not officially been considered a country at war.
5. Tacit agreement of the international community to the annexation of the Crimea, even without its official recognition.

What has Russia lost in the course of this information war?

1. Instead of expected demoralization and disintegration of the Ukrainian society, consolidation, support for the political institutions and the state by the Ukrainian society, integration and convergence of Ukrainian regions did happen.
2. Destruction of civil society in Russia did happen.
3. Deprofessionalization of the Russian media and demoralization of journalists did happen.
4. The image of Russia as a modern state was destroyed; Russia has incurred huge reputational losses.
5. Deterioration in the situation of Russian-speaking diaspora in many countries, deepening isolation from the rest of the society in these countries did happen.
6. The number of Russia’s allies has decreased; the number of enemies has risen.

5. The war for consciousness

Any war makes an impact on public consciousness, and changes the consciousness of some people. Psychological traumas and the effects of war were recorded at all times. After World War I, these effects have been the subject of artistic analysis in literature and art, and then in psychiatry, psychology and medicine.

But war for consciousness is a relatively new phenomenon on a historical scale. Its special study has not even started. Wars for consciousness and wars in the “territory of consciousness”, becoming a special theater of war, were spoken of during the Cold War. These wars were considered an integral part of the Cold War, “Psychological War”. Though, war for consciousness can not be reduced to psychological war.

Psychological warfare is aimed primarily at the emotional side of the psyche and, in part, at the rational one. The purpose of a psychological warfare is the demoralization of the enemy; it appeals to the instincts of self-preservation, to the feelings of fear, hatred and patriotism. Referring to the ratio of people, one can dispel confidence in the victory of the army, sow doubts about the policy of the government, and evoke distrust of political leaders or ideological guidelines in the framework of a psychological warfare. The weapon of a psychological warfare is information: truthful information if it is concealed by the enemy propaganda, or disinformation to deceive the enemy or to hide the inconvenient truth from the population.

Psychological warfare contained elements of war for consciousness in the confrontation between the two systems, but these elements were used unknowingly, they were recorded more as unintended effects. Nobody was disseminating chewing gum, jeans, jazz and rock 'n' roll with the aim of undermining the foundations of the Soviet regime, but it just happened this way. At the same time, no one would answer for sure, did jeans and vinyl records in themselves undermine the Soviet regime, or it was done by smugglers, black-marketeers and narrow corporate interests that were building shadow economy inside the planned economy? If this was the effect of the shadow economy, then the foundations could have been undermined not only by music on discs, but by soap or toilet paper.

Nevertheless, the changes in people's minds couldn’t pass unnoticed; and whole teams of researchers and developers have begun developing tools and techniques to stimulate these changes, and to manage them.

It quickly became clear that true or false information about anything does not work by itself, if a person has in the mind such mechanisms which allow recognizing only a particular type of information, or interpreting it in a certain way. And then they faced the task to influence the mechanisms of recognition, processing and interpretation of information. This is what the war for consciousness has begun with.

For example, ethics and morality do historically change, and these are very complex mechanisms of consciousness in themselves. Carl Schmitt allocated elemental moral imperative of political consciousness, a categorical pair of “friend or foe”. We can assume that this categorical opposition defines moral and political choice in all situations faced by people, including war. But who should be considered friend and who foe?

Tribal morality did not require reflection and mediation of complex theories and arguments when deciding who was a “friend”, and who was “a foe”. A friend meant a relative by blood, by origin. Automatically, “friends” by faith, language, communication, by direct acquaintance and friendship were determined. But after complicating social relations, such simplicity was not enough. In medieval armies adherents of different religions could fight side by side, being subjects of a same monarch. Thus, Orthodox and Catholics of the one army fought at Grunwald against other Catholics of the other army. There are many examples in history when Christians and Muslims of an army fought with another army, containing troops of Christians and Muslims. Even more difficult is at civil wars, where a “son goes against his father and a brother against his brother”. During World War I, armies of warring parties consisted of representatives of different ethnic groups, and “friends” there were representatives of citizens of modern nation. Representatives of one ethnos, one religion and one language could well turn out be on different sides of the front. Recognition of “friends” and “foes” goes through the schemes of interpretation, through theories and doctrines learned by a person. Marxists and Communists tried to replace by a class doctrine the well-established category of national identity by the beginning of the XX^th century. Mass indoctrination of social and individual consciousness began. Schemes and doctrines of national identity were ousted from the consciousness and replaced by proposed schemes of class identity. It changed the guidelines of people, their ethics and morality, organized in a different way behavior of a person, his/her preferences of good and evil.

For small wars and local conflicts structures of consciousness are of little importance. In such wars it is still possible to win at the cost of numerical superiority, weapons quality, and economic strength. But civilization and global conflicts make structures of consciousness become a decisive factor.

We still know very little about a war for consciousness. But something is still clear. Consciousness, both individual and social, is organized holistically and systemically. It is based on a certain view of the world, or on ontology. The ontology is the basis and the most solid foundation of consciousness. If a person knows how the world works, then everything else derives from this knowledge. The efforts in war for consciousness are therefore directed, firstly, at ontology, destruction of the view of the world. The view of the world can not be destroyed from the outside; it is being acquired during the whole life and education of a person, and becomes part of his/her consciousness. All thinking and creativity abilities of a person support a sustainable view of the world. And the more complex the view of the world is, the greater is the role of theoretical and critical thinking in its building and maintaining. But if one deprives a person of critical thinking, then it becomes easy to destroy the integrity of his/her consciousness. He/she can be proposed a variety of knowledge that is stored in the memory without any system and make the consciousness fragmented and manageable from the outside.

The stunning effect of the information war unfolded by Russia in 2013-2014, was the opportunity to slip game and art scenes under the guise of documentary evidence, and people believed this “information”, mistaking it for facts. Why has it become possible? Just because for many years, Russian television and media undermined the ability of Russian viewer and reader to the critical attitude to information. Ufology, fantastic versions of national and world history, pseudo-scientific theories, quasi-religious doctrines that filled the air have made people accustom not to comprehend and process information, but to accept it in the form in which it has been presented. Therefore, when actors play roles of witnesses of military events, it has also been accepted uncritically; when musical arrangement and cinematography many months created a picture of Kyiv in fire and smoke, this picture has become for the audience more real than all the rest, and through this art image has been interpreted all the other information.

For non-critical consciousness, all information is presented together with schemes of interpretation; it is inseparable from these schemes. Actually, media does not reflect facts and images in themselves, but these are only used as carriers of theses, guidelines and ideologems for the transmission of these theses and guidelines. The facts and pictures are forgotten soon after, or they leave after only emotional memory, but theses and guidelines are remembered. Here, a person considers them to be of his own mind.

When a person with critical thinking or just an observer noted in conversations with victims of information warfare that they were citing television or propaganda clichés, it met sincere indignation. The people were sacredly convinced that these were their own thoughts and opinions.

The ontological core of a war for consciousness in 2013-2014 was the “Russian World”. The very idea of the “Russian World” was offered by Russian intellectuals back in the 90s of the last century. Initially, the “Russian World” was understood just as ontology, as a response to the challenges of time and civilization, which Russia and its intellectuals were subject to after the fall of the USSR. The “Russian World” referred to the achievements of the Russian philosophy and science (philosophy of the Soviet time, but not the Soviet one) on the understanding and interpretation of the world (cosmos, universe).

But as soon as the idea of the “Russian World” was launched to the masses (“That an idea thrown into masses is a wench thrown to a regiment”, Igor Guberman), it was immediately simplified and made stupid. The “Russian World” began interpreted in the doctrines of the Cold War as “a Russian part of the world”, which differs from the “Pax Americana”, the “Islamic World”. That is, instead of ontology or a view of the world, this idea became the basis for a new redivision of the world.

And if so, then the Russian language has become the weapon of seizure by one part of the world of another one. The spread of the Russian language meant the Russian expansion to those areas where the Russian language has been used. Hence the “Krymnash” (“The Crimea is ours”, etc.)

A war for territory is anachronistic for modern consciousness and unacceptable in the modern world. But in that kind of consciousness, in that view of the world which are formed by the Russian media and education, such war is not only permissible, but also encouraged.

The meaning and the content of a war for consciousness will be one of the main areas of political, social, cultural and humanitarian studies in the near future. In the meantime:

What was Russia hoping to gain in the war for consciousness?

1. In the early stages (late 1990s — early 2000s), the task was to limit the influence of the West on Russian citizens, to stop the globalization and Westernization of the population and society in Russia.
2. Restoration of the idea of Empire in Russia’s public consciousness and in Russian-language environments and diaspora.
3. Expansion of the “Russian World”.
4. Return to Russia of a world power status.
5. Intercepting civilizational leadership.

What has Russia gained during the war for consciousness?

I have no answer to this question. It is much easier to answer the following question:

What has Russia lost during the war for consciousness?

1. Developers of the concept of the “Russian World”, Russian and post-Soviet intellectuals and thinkers, researchers of the very war for consciousness have been displaced into opposition and marginalized; national loyalists, adherents of revenge and imperial ideas, political strategists and developers of questionable doctrines such as “sovereign democracy” have been instead declared the elite, etc.
2. The level of philosophical designs, research centers, intellectual activity and higher education in general has plunged, and not only in social and humanitarian field.
3. Reduction of social consciousness to primitive forms of past eras has taken place — in part, to the Soviet mentality, in part, to even more ancient forms. Pseudoscientific theories, pseudopagan cults and teachings have largely disseminated.
4. Decline in ethical and moral standards in society has taken place; people have lost the ability to define good and evil on their own.

And this is not a complete list of losses and defeats.

One should have specifically analyzed the reasons for the defeat of Russia in this war. Not only defeats, but relative successes, albeit questionable and temporary. It requires though a deeper study and much longer time. Moreover, this analysis should be started in the reverse order: from the analysis of social and individual consciousness (a war for consciousness) back to the factors that inevitably lead to defeat in a hot war.