What lies behind the activation of the anti-terror operation in Ukraine? What surprises is Ukraine to encounter in the near future? Does the fact that gunmen took off to Donetsk indicate victory?

These and other questions in the interviewwith the EuroBelarus Information Service covered Uladzimir Matskevich, the head of the Board of the International Consortium “EuroBelarus”.

— After the inauguration Ukraine President announced a seven-day truce, which was later prolonged for three more days. However, only National Guard and the army halted hostilities, while the gunmen never did that. Why was the temporary peace unsuccessful and why do peaceful talks bring no fruit?

— Well, the truce coincided in time with the summit in Brussels, where Ukraine signed the economic part of the EU Association Agreement, and hostilities could have considerably complicate the work of the summit.

Secondly, a ten-day truce gave Ukrainian army a chance to plan their further actions. The strategy of the gunmen, which consists in hiding behind the backs of the citizens, made it impossible for the Ukrainian army to destroy the terrorists without causing harm to the civilians.

Thus, Ukrainian army had only one variant left — to block Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, by this depriving the gunmen of the armaments and human resources.

By not answering back with the gunfire, Ukrainian army demonstrated enormous restraint. The terrorists gave a very simple excuse to their actions, saying that they have no central command, i.e. they can’t promise to keep the truce.

I can’t agree with the assertion that the truce was useless.

— After the anti-terror operation was reactivated, Ukrainian army quickly won back Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. What was the reason for such a success?

— Attacking the seized towns after the truce was ended was meant for demonstration that the Ukrainian army has enough strength and means to eradicate the gunmen and submitting the gunmen. Only caution and care about civilians prevents Ukrainian army from intensification of the military operation.

The gunmen were well aware that their stay in Slavyansk and Kramatorsk is but temporary: the towns are small, there are little resources, and they couldn’t survive there for a long time. So from the military perspective they might have made the only possible decision, which was to dislocate the remaining forces from Slavyansk and Kramatorsk to Donetsk, a city with a fifty thousand people. Thus, running away to Donetsk enables the gunmen to survive for some more months, and looks like a logical strategic step.

We can reproach the authors of the anti-terror operation for letting the gunmen break through to Donetsk. However, I don’t know all the circumstances and the entire situation; so let us not make haste with reprimands.

— The gunmen are complaining that Kremlin left them alone. Did Moscow really step back or, vice versa, it was a planned step that will bring victory?

— From the point of view of the gunmen, who are basically victims of Moscow’s irresponsible political games, Kremlin has really betrayed them.

However, we don’t think that Kremlin doesn’t support the gunmen: it provided them with the weaponry and money; the information war is going on, and its nature has changed now. The voice of the international community and the large-scale sanctions gave their results; and now Kremlin is not ready to introduce Russian army to Ukraine. Thus, we are to explain to ourselves, to the Russian society and to the world community why Russia has left all these people to die. Now it is obvious that the Russian media are getting prepared to explain the world why this operation failed.

— What surprises should Ukraine expect from the Russian “quasi-mystical chauvinism”, as Zbigniew Brzezinski referred to the state of the Russian society?

— We can fear provocations and subversions, which is evident from the shooting at Maidan and from the attempts to harm Ukraine financially. Subversive actions will continue, and let us hope they won’t affect Ukraine’s strategic gas and oil store, or even nuclear power station.

On the one hand, we are facing devastation in Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies and carelessness of the local Ukrainian authorities; and on the other — cynicism and impudence of the gunmen makes the situation with subversive actions in Ukraine extremely dangerous.

Wars where guerilla methods are used always run a risk to bring terrorist actions outside the scale of the military actions, as it happened towards the end of the war in Chechnya; when guerilla forces are subdued this result is easy to predict.

Besides, it is not only military and financial help that Russia is helping the gunmen with, but also planning of military operations. It could well be that the Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian GRU) and Federal Security Service (FSB) that could plan terrorist acts that would have very serious consequences.

Since the beginning of this year I’ve been repeatedly saying that one of the Russia’s goals is to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. And to do this, all methods are good: information war, bribing of officials and troopers, subversive actions and terror attacks.

Ukrainian army had every opportunity to block Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. If it would have happened, in 2-6 weeks the gunmen would surrender themselves, and no harm would be brought to the civilians and the towns. But in Donetsk military actions can extend until the end of the year, or even for some years. Now we need more decisive actions both from the army as well as from the civil services, and average citizens to block the gunmen in the city. And a lot will depend on what stance do city authorities take.

— On July 2 Putin made a five-hour blitz-visit to Minsk. We could consider this visit to be symbolic if Belarus didn’t refuse to launch a trade war with Ukraine shortly before that.

— We still don’t know what Putin and Lukashenko were discussing; so let’s not guess.

By paying that visit Putin tried to demonstrate that Belarus is tied up with Russia; so it was a demonstration of Belarus-Russia allied relations. It remains unknown to what extent is Belarusan regime willing to be a Russia’s ally in the Ukrainian issue; Lukashenko is constantly avoiding the demonstration of his clear position on that issue.

Putin doesn’t need Belarusan military and economical support that much; he rather needs political and symbolic support. Kremlin has lost its foreign policy initiative; all Putin’s actions are aimed at Russia. Thus, the demonstrational visit to Minsk was aimed to impress the Russian society and the Russian audience, while Belarusans were not particularly impressed with that.