Any attempts to establish peace in Ukraine without Russia’s real refusal to support gunmen will be fictitious.

On August 26 tripartite negotiations on settling the military conflict in Ukraine took place in Minsk. The only result of the meeting proudly announced by Lukashenko is that the negotiations are to be continued. Thus, the suggestion of the President Nazarbaev to continue the discussion of problematic issues on Ukraine in the same format was supported, Lukashenko said, adding that there is a possibility that the format will change to OSCE-Russia-Ukraine. However, it is not the result everyone was waiting for.

The comments on two-hour negotiations between Poroshenko and Putin were quite blurry and with platitudes.

We should admit that the negotiations simply failed. Even Lukashenko didn’t hide that: “I state with regret that the situation has gone bad enough, and that no separate steps, technical arrangements would lead to a settlement without fundamentals decisions at the highest level. Of course, we all wanted a breakthrough: immediate pivotal decisions, concrete agreements to stop the bloodshed, start the political dialogue in Ukraine with the participation of all parties to the conflict, and settle economic disputes.”

Still, the summit in Minsk took place, and not all parties to it came to be losers.

Andrei Yahorau, the head of the Centre for European Transformation, comments on the results of the negotiations in the interview with the EuroBelarus Information Service.

— The negotiations on Ukraine passed with no concrete results. Poroshenko went to Minsk for peace; Putin was talking exclusively about Russia’s multi-billion dollar losses in case Ukraine is associated with the EU and didn’t mention war at all. Is there a chance that at the meeting in Minsk the parties managed to reach agreement on the cessation of Ukrainian conflict or at least to find the points of contact?

— Of course, the main hope that the meeting can bring peace or at least bring closer to it, wasn’t justified. The parties remained at the same place they started from. Poroshenko’s principal stance was to defend Ukraine’s independence in defining its inner structure and the choice of geopolitical orientations. Besides, Ukraine’s President also insisted on his principle of settling the situation at the east: to stop delivery of arms to separatists organized by Russia, full disarmament of gunmen and organizing a corridor for them to leave.

Putin came with an absolutely different stance, basically asking Ukraine to reject EU Association Agreement on the basis that this decision will lead to economic losses for Russia. As to the situation at the southeast of Ukraine, Putin contended for non-acceptance of forceful and military settlement of the situation.

The rhetoric of Nazarbaev and Lukashenko mostly came down to calling for peace: establishing peace at the east of Ukraine, refusing to use violence, de-escalating the conflict, providing humanitarian aid, etc. Even though neither Lukashenko nor Nazarbaev defined who furthers the escalation of the situation, they both basically supported Russia.

Any attempts to establish truce without Russia’s consent to stop supporting gunmen will be fictitious, and we have already seen that. For Russia the truce will give an opportunity to slow down the situation and restore the forces of separatists. It will disrupt the pace of the anti-terror operation and only worsen Ukraine’s situation.

If the negotiation process is continued in the “OSCE-Russia-Ukraine” format, it won’t resolve the situation, too; it’s too weak. As a mediator, OSCE can give no guarantees that the agreements are observed; besides, there are doubts regarding its independence from Russia.

Agreements on the formation of a commission that will be coordinating the question of minimization of economic damage for the countries of the Customs Union and Russia in case EU Association Agreement comes into force look like an attempt to drag the process of ratification of this agreement. And why does Ukraine need that?! Even if we assume that Putin is right, we’ll have to admit that Russia state is so weak that it can’t defend its market from illegal goods, and that Russian producers are uncompetitive even in comparison with Ukrainian ones.

— High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Aston mentioned the important role of Belarus in holding the meeting on settling the situation in Ukraine in Minsk. Can we say that her words are political preferences for the official Minsk on the part of the EU?

— And what have you expected from her to say?! It is a mere diplomatic politeness, no more than that. Indeed, Belarus served as an arena for this meeting, organized the logistics, etc. Ashton thanked for all that.

— Lukashenko tried on the role of a peacekeeper — all his statements and behavior abound in that (for example, at the general photos he is standing between Putin and Poroshenko). How successful has he played his role?

— To play this role good photos are not enough; an independent stance, power, and influence at the international arena are required, at least to call things by their own names. Lukashenko didn’t even manage to say a sensible thing, except for general calls for peace and de-escalation of conflict.

— What benefits can Lukashenko draw from the Minsk summit?

— If the process of further negotiations on Ukraine in Minsk with high level of representation works out, it will enable Lukashenko to talk about the end of the international isolation. Not only state propaganda already speculates on that, but also a number of independent media and experts. But talking is one thing, and to really step out of isolation is another.

— Which goals did meeting in Minsk pursue? For some reason Putin’s partners in Customs Union — Lukashenko and Nazarbaev — were present at the meeting, though the meeting was timed to the war in Ukraine and the ways to stop it, not about Belarus or Kazakhstan.

— It’s harder to understand for me why two European Commissioners were present at the meeting… Symbolically, Lukashenko and Nazarbaev were needed to provide the full picture of the two integration projects — Eurasian and European, and Ukraine between them. Politically, they enforced Russia’s stance in the Ukrainian question, de-facto supporting its demands (truce, nonviolence, non-recognition of Russia’s aggression).