The comicality of the presidential campaign-2015 doesn’t give any reasons for worrying about the legitimization of the regime.

Legitimization of Lukashenko’s regime in the West is impossible: decorative nature of the current “elections” gives no reasons for taking them seriously even when it comes to those western politicians, who are very loyal to the regime.

What differ presidential campaign-2015 from the former ones? Why has opposition started chasing the phantom of power again? What consequences will the current campaign have for Belarus?

Uladzimir Matskevich, the head of the Board of the International Consortium “EuroBelarus”, answered the questions of the EuroBelarus Information Service.

— In 2001, 2006, and 2010 opposition had human, organizational, financial resources and certain support abroad. But even back then the opposition didn’t hope to win — participation in campaign was reduced to the fight for minds. In 2015 opposition has nothing, but all of it has gone to elections. Why?

— In fact, opposition didn’t have resources for the victory at any of the elections, including the first presidential elections of 1994.

In 1994 Kebich’s and Lukashenko’s resources surmounted common resources of Pazniak and Shushkevich. But back then resources weren’t the main factor of the organization of campaign; at least there were chances to fight to get the electorate. First, there were no long-term duping propaganda, while the stock of democratic strength was still preserved. Mass media were working for Kebich; however, their convincingness and trust towards the media differed from what we have now.

Since 2001 Lukashenko’s winning difference in resources was that huge that one had to demonstrate enormous creativity and resourcefulness in order to fight for victory. However, primitive factors, such as popular discontent, were estimated; but the propaganda didn’t correspond to the social structure that was formed in the society in the 1990s.

In 2006 the opposition basically had no resources for organization of electoral campaign: mass media was in full command of the regime, as well as the administrative resource. Human and financial resources that the opposition had were divided in half for two candidates, one of whom was the obvious result of the third-generation political techniques that rather hampered the electoral campaign of the opposition than helped it.

In 2010 the opposition could only lead rearguard actions. By this time even the most naïve understood that the opposition should be united; otherwise, it can be ignored. In return the authorities made a circus out of elections, having registered a number of candidates (who due to the miserable resources weren’t even able to collect the required 100 thousand signatures) and made a demonstrational fight between the candidates, being absolutely calm for the results of the voting.

As to the current elections, nobody has anything left. Public moods are obvious for everyone — indifference and passiveness to the election campaign. These elections are not of any interest for anyone anymore — that is seen by the collection of signatures, activity of commands, and complete indifference of the society towards this campaign.

— What is the real goal of opposition’s participation in the “elections”? It cannot be that the United Civil Party that has no sources, no levers, and no mechanisms for influencing the society is able to impose its own rules of game to the Belarusan regime.

— We need to define two reasons: the opposition has never been able to do anything but participate in the electoral campaigns according to the regime’s scenario.

The United Civil Party and the remains of the “Tell the Truth!” campaign with Tatiana Karatkevich as a candidate are trying to keep themselves at least as public persons. If they don’t participate in these elections, they’ll lose everything afterwards and stop their existence as public persons.

— If opposition’s participation won’t influence the result of the campaign, it can at least change the attitude of the West towards Lukashenko’s regime. Many experts are talking about the legitimation of the Lukashenko’s regime. Will the participation of the opposition in the pseudo-elections legitimize Lukashenko’s regime in the West?

— Even that is impossible now, since the comicality of the presidential campaign-2015 doesn’t give any reasons for taking them seriously even when it comes to those western politicians, who are very loyal to the regime.

However, if the opposition was able to present a united candidate it could have been viewed as a step towards the legitimation of the regime. In order to avoid legitimation a candidate similar to Statkevich would be needed, which the opposition wouldn’t go for. The comicality of the presidential campaign-2015 doesn’t give any reasons for worrying about the legitimization of the regime.

— Why did the opposition turned down Statkevich’s candidature as the united candidate?

— It would be incorrect to consider the mistakes of the opposition only within the frames of this campaign. The opposition has chosen the wrong path quite long time ago, and all that we have been observing during the last 20 years is the consequence of a wrong aim set in the middle of the 1990s.

The opposition concentrated its efforts at the electoral campaigns, having no relation with the civil society, active part of the society, active intelligence, and intellectuals in between the “elections”.

Back in 2012 it became clear that the active part of the civil society, NGOs, creative intelligence, intellectuals, and journalists aren’t showing any interest towards the political opposition. Something that becomes clear for the active part of the society runs current in a year or two. That is why by concentrating on idealistic images about the society formulated back in the industrial era more than a hundred years ago the opposition doesn’t see the real situation and will never enter the structure of the public expectations.

Due to that opposition is destroying the intellectual structure that it should be providing instead. For example, by supporting the complimentary complaisant policy of the expert community, opposition destroys real analytics and real social research, thus acting on the basis of wrong images about the reality.

Then the opposition involves intellectual forces, who are trying to build some projects on the basis of wrong image about the reality. They do not understand that to improve the situation long-term, thematic, regular work is needed. If on the eve of the presidential elections 2001 within several years the required infrastructure for the work of the political parties could have been restored, though with great difficulties, the defeat of the 2006 marked the end of the quick reanimation of the opposition. By non-admitting the reality the action of the opposition became comical: they were rather describing work than actually doing something.

Statkevich’s nomination wouldn’t lead to opposition’s participation in the presidential campaign: it was obvious for everyone that Jarmoshyna and the regime won’t register him as a real candidate. Understanding that, the opposition with its wrong picture of the reality decided to reject Statkevich’s candidacy: if he doesn’t get registered there is no need in trying.

The opposition shouldn’t have taken part in these “elections” as candidates at all but rather leave the whole circus to the regime with its fake candidates, which would lead to the bigger isolation of the Belarusan regime both in the eyes of the international community and in the eyes of the thinking public in Belarus. The opposition that staked on Statkevich could have gathered the flawless part of the opposition in a community that the protest part of our society would agree to recognize as a real, though scanty, opposition.

What we have now isn’t perceived as a real opposition, but reminds of Soviet times, when alongside with the communist parties some so-called opposition parties that had no real influence were allowed. This is exactly the situation that we have in Belarus: there are register parties in the country that have no area for political activity but exist as decorations at the front of the political regime of Belarus.

Estimations for the protest of the electorate that the opposition is hoping for, when watching the economic difficulties of the regime, should have been found stupid long time ago. Unorganized protests never have politically important effect.

— Presidential campaign 2010 and the Square 2010 demonstrated that the protest potential of Belarusans is huge, and has only increased for the past 5 years. Why isn’t it developing into an active phase then?

— Let’s not overestimate: protest potential remains low. We observed it in very limited local situations: Square 2006 and Square 2010. Though these protests were inspiring for someone, their scale is incomparable with the one required for influencing the policy of the regime.

The other thing is that protest moods potentially exist. However, for them to become the factor of the social and political life concrete offers are required: all the dissatisfied should turn their face towards those who offer a concrete way-out, which would be acceptable for the dissatisfied, while people, who propose these offers should have people’s credit. If it doesn’t happen, the presence of dissatisfied in the country never enters the active phase, but remains at the level of potential.

— What consequences can the current presidential campaign have for the future of the country?

— In the social, economic, and political sense these “elections” will have no consequences. Let’s hope that all the tragicomedy of the current situation will make smarter and inspire to read independent social research at least the active part of the society, not the invented idealistic utopian construction — communist, libertarian, nationalist — that all political parties are still using. We need to reject the utopian worldview and stop idealizing the situation to make real actions.

None of what we see in the opposition and in the civil society is taken in consideration as real factors that are able to influence the situation. Opposition and civil society leaders might be invited to embassies and international conferences, but only to show: western countries are attached to European values and know that there are people, who do not cooperate with the regime. But this is the demonstration of the value attitude, not the pragmatic stake on these forces when it comes to work with Belarus as a nation, a state, and an agent of international relations.

International community sees only the regime, only Lukashenko. Well, it is an authoritarian regime that violently suppresses any democratic, public tendencies in the country; this is a fact. And all sober politicians take this fact into account.